Persist separate display modes and timeouts in seconds for battery and USB power, expose four controls in WebConfig and CLI, and apply one shared policy across display-equipped roles.
Detect R8 external power from a USB host or calibrated battery voltage above 4.21 V, with cached sampling and hysteresis. Add policy, persistence, browser, and R8 power-detection regression coverage.
Accept the upstream empty-prefix neighbor.remove command after whitespace normalization while preserving invalid-key checks. Cover repeater and room-server removal paths with regression tests.
Fixes#8
Hardware captures show that a median and lower quartile can follow the interferer while the 12.5th percentile retains the quiet floor. Use that estimate with existing weighting and bounded rise recovery. Wait for settling after every RX re-arm and allow thirty seconds for a complete idle-sample block.
Add captured-sample, low-tail limitation, and real CLI setter regressions. Preserve RXPS intent when parsing an off command with trailing whitespace. All 162 native cases and 24 Python regressions pass.
Port the measured RXPS model without changing Cascade wire preambles or automatically enabling experimental levels. Use a spaced weighted median with bounded calibration windows, preserve packet ownership across CAD, and check actual SX126x receive mode before recovery.
Preserve Cascade sleep and radio fixes, integrate the new sensor and board profiles, and correct BSEC script inheritance and the MKE UART pin conflict. Native regressions, production-method/SPI harnesses, and ESP32, nRF52, and STM32 builds pass. Hardware comparison and fault-injection validation are recorded privately.
List limited public-key prefixes, reasons, and wait times in bounded pages, with full-key details for targeted clearing. Queries preserve quotas and recovery timers.
Validated with 71 native tests, Full repeater and room-server builds, and a 909.500 MHz RF test covering 10 forwarded adverts, 2 blocked adverts, and forwarding after targeted clear.
Review of the branch found one merge-blocking lifecycle hole and three
correctness gaps where the implementation stopped short of contracts the design
had already written down. All four are real; each was confirmed against the
source (two of them against hardware) before anything changed.
**P1 — a quarantined client could still produce a clean bridge stop.** The
cooperative teardown set `_teardown_complete` unconditionally, so a slot whose
`esp_mqtt_client_stop()` had not completed — deliberately skipped by
`destroySlotClients()` and marked Quarantined — still let the trampoline publish
the acknowledgement. The owner then freed the queue and buffers and allowed a
restart while that SDK task might still be running: exactly the ownership
ambiguity StopUnproven exists to remove. The ack is now withheld unless EVERY
client is proven stopped, so one unproven client leaves the whole bridge
unproven. The rule lives in MQTTClientState.h (`mqttStopMayBeAcknowledged`) with
host tests, alongside the state predicates moved out of the bridge.
**P2 — the F04 protection did not cover a client that was still connecting.**
`softDisconnect()` returns ESP_OK immediately when the client is not connected,
so for a slot mid-DNS/TLS/CONNECT it cancelled nothing: the attempt ran on and
its CONNECTED event arrived after the new configuration was applied, and with
callbacks registered once per client and esp-mqtt events carrying no generation,
nothing could tell it from the new attempt's. A reconfigure that lands on a
`Starting` client now stops it, joining its SDK task, before applying the new
configuration. A Connected client still takes the cheap softDisconnect path,
which is where the fragmentation argument applies. One helper
(`closeLiveClientForReconfigure`) so the two call sites cannot drift.
**P2 — a failed renewal bounce still advanced the effective expiry.** Minting
updates `token_expires_at` immediately and the renewal decision read it, so a
bounce that failed looked complete: the next pass saw a fresh future expiry and
never retried, and clearing `last_token_renewal` re-armed nothing. Slots now
carry `applied_token_expires_at` — the expiry of the credential the CONNECTION
is using — which only advances when a connect or reconnect has carried it. A
failed bounce leaves it on the old credential, so the renewal stays due.
**P2 — config-committed and start-accepted were conflated.** `connect()`
returned one result for both, so a start that failed after the configuration had
committed left `applied_config` describing the previous configuration, and the
next recreate-or-reuse decision could reuse a client whose trust policy was not
the one it believed. `applyConfig()` is now its own wrapper operation;
`applied_config` records the commit, activation records the start. The reconnect
ladder resets there too rather than in `teardownSlot()` — the old endpoint's
history still applies until a replacement configuration actually commits.
Two of my own bugs surfaced on hardware while testing this, both fixed here:
- `recreateSlotClient()` called the full `teardownSlot()`, which cleared
`broker_uri`, the just-minted token and both expiries out from under a
configuration that had already been decided, so a recreate handed the SDK an
empty URI and an empty token. It now stops the client and swaps the object,
touching nothing else, and the apply step refuses to configure a URI that
changed under it rather than passing it on.
- `stopSlotClient()` quarantined on any non-OK result, but `ESP_FAIL` from
`esp_mqtt_client_stop()` means "client is in invalid state", i.e. not started:
there was no task to join, the safest state there is. It was observed
quarantining healthy clients on hardware. The case that genuinely cannot be
proven is a stop that never RETURNS, which cannot surface here at all — it
hangs the task, which is what the bridge-level timeout contains.
Hardware (Heltec V4, 5 live slots): a reconfigure landing on a connecting client
logs `reconfigure during connect - stopping to cancel the attempt`; a broker
holding the CONNACK sees the client close the socket and the disabled slot never
connects; `wss`→`mqtt`→`wss` recreate cycles reconnect each way; a blackholed
endpoint recovers. 499/499 native tests, four envs clean.
The decision half of the client-configuration fix, as a pure header so every
transition is a host test rather than a hardware run.
`MqttEffectiveConfig` is the complete owned description of what a slot's client
should be configured with — URI (its own copy, because `slot.broker_uri` is
rewritten in place), transport, trust policy, auth mode, credential pointers,
buffer size, keepalive. Two things are deliberate:
- the transport is derived from the URI scheme, and the trust policy is
normalised against it: an unencrypted transport verifies nothing, whatever
certificate material was requested, so a plaintext endpoint can never look
like it retained a verified policy;
- absent credentials are represented as nullptr and written as "", never
omitted. IDF's `esp_mqtt_set_if_config()` treats NULL as "leave unchanged",
so a cleared wrapper pointer cannot erase an SDK-held credential, while an
empty string overwrites it and leaves the CONNECT's username flag clear
(verified on an ESP32-S3 against a local broker on IDF 4.4).
`mqttConfigRecreateDecision()` says whether the existing client can be
reconfigured in place. Reuse covers every credential and auth-mode change and
any endpoint move within one scheme — the cases that matter for reconnect and
token renewal, where a client create/destroy cycle is the fork's documented
internal-heap fragmentation driver. Recreation is reserved for the three fields
that cannot be overwritten safely: a transport (scheme) change, a trust-policy
or CA-certificate change, and growth beyond the allocated buffer capacity,
which IDF 4.4 fixes at client init.
Client certificates are excluded on purpose: `setClientCertificate()` has no
caller in the firmware, so modelling mutual TLS here would be untested
configuration surface. Noted in the header.
Nothing consumes this yet; the bridge is migrated onto it after the result
propagation and generation-guard steps, which it depends on.
The timeout fallback did the two things that cannot be done safely to a task
that may still be inside mbedTLS or holding esp-mqtt's API mutex: it deleted
that task from the loop task, then force-stopped and deleted the clients it
owned, then freed the queue and buffers it can reach. `esp_mqtt_client_stop()`
waits on the API mutex and the task's stopped event with no bound, so killing
its caller strands the next one; a second stop sees the run flag already clear
and returns failure without joining. Nothing in that path established
quiescence, and `canFlashAfterStop()` could only withhold OTA afterwards.
Changes, all of them about who owns what:
- `MQTTLifecycle` gains a `StopUnproven` state (appended, so existing values
keep their numbering). `StopTimedOut` now leads there and releases NOTHING;
it still fires `ota_release` so the OTA barrier aborts. `acceptsNewWork`,
`mayRestart` and `isStopInProgress` are false there, `mayTouchOwnedState` is
true, and `end()`'s wait loop still terminates.
- `begin()` refuses to start while a stop is unproven. A new start was never
proof that the previous clients stopped, and it used to clear the dirty latch
that withheld OTA. Because a start is now impossible from `StopUnproven`,
clearing that latch on an accepted start is sound.
- A late acknowledgement is honoured. The task publishes it only after tearing
its clients down, so it proves the same thing whenever it arrives; the
deadline is an availability policy, not a statement about what the ack means.
`pollLateStopAck()` releases the withheld resources and makes the bridge
restartable — a slow stop (a blackholed WSS broker can hold the SDK well past
the budget) no longer costs a reboot.
- The handshake flags become `std::atomic<bool>` with release/acquire, and the
ack moves into the task trampoline immediately before `vTaskDelete(nullptr)`,
gated on a `_teardown_complete` flag the loop sets. Published from inside the
loop it proved teardown returned, not that the task had stopped executing —
and `volatile` ordered none of it. This is the soak campaign's blocker #20,
the one item on its list that can corrupt memory.
- The force-stop paths are gone with their only caller: `destroySlotClients()`
and `teardownSlot()` no longer take a `force` flag.
- `get mqtt.status` reports "previous stop unproven, reboot to recover" instead
of a bare "not running", latched so it survives end() clearing the singleton.
Two lifecycle tests asserted the old contract and are re-encoded, not deleted:
a timed-out stop is no longer `Stopped`-and-released, and "repeated failed
stops leave the bridge restartable" becomes "repeated *slow* stops recover on
their late ack" plus a new case pinning that a never-acknowledged stop stays
unusable for the boot. That availability trade is the point of the change.
NTPClient::forceUpdate() treated any non-empty datagram arriving on its fixed
local port 1337 as a time response: it ignored the read length, the version,
the mode, the stratum, the leap indicator and any request/response correlation,
then handed the bytes at offset 40 to the bridge. The bridge only checked that
the derived epoch was at least 2026-01-01 before calling settimeofday() and
writing the RTC. A host probe against the installed library source accepted a
one-byte non-NTP datagram and produced epoch 2085978496. Anyone able to land a
UDP datagram during a query window could set a bogus clock, which then feeds JWT
issuance, certificate validity and packet timestamps.
Replace that path with probeNtpServer(): one exchange per server on a fresh
ephemeral socket, closed again on every exit. A reply is accepted only if it is
a full 48 bytes, from the address and port queried, NTPv3/v4 mode 4, from a
synchronised server (no leap alarm, stratum 1-15), echoing the random transmit
timestamp of the request, with an epoch inside a plausible range. Rejected
datagrams leave the clock alone and do not end the wait, so an early bogus
packet cannot pre-empt the real answer. Era-1 (post-2036) timestamps convert
forward instead of wrapping into 1900.
The diagnostic now runs the same validated probe, so `get mqtt.ntp.diag`
answers the question it is asked — would this server be trusted? — instead of
reporting a datagram nothing checked. It also no longer leaves its UDP socket
open after the probe, and each server's per-probe result carries the reason it
failed ("DNS failed", "unsolicited reply", "server unsynced", ...). The
diagnostic still blocks its caller; making it asynchronous is a separate change.
The acceptance rules live in NtpValidation.h (pure, host-tested), including the
review's one-byte-datagram reproduction.
Four of the hand-written error labels named the wrong failure against the
installed SDK: Wi-Fi reason 201 is NO_AP_FOUND (reported as "security
mismatch"), 202 is AUTH_FAIL (reported as "auth mode rejected"), 39 is TIMEOUT
(reported as "SSID not found") and 34 is MISSING_ACKS (reported as an
"AP state mismatch"). esp-tls 0x8008 is TCP_CLOSED_FIN, not a timeout, and
0x8010 is CERT_PARTLY_OK, not a generic mbedTLS error. 0x800B, labelled
"cert verify failed", is not an esp-tls error at all. So the one line an
operator reads to find out why a node is offline could name the wrong cause.
Move the tables into MQTTErrorLabels.h (pure, host-tested) with every value
static_asserted against the SDK enum/#define actually being compiled, so a
framework bump fails the build instead of relabelling errors in the field.
Codes the SDK does not define — including 61/88/168, which had labels no
header supports — now return no label and the caller prints the raw number.
Also keep the CONNACK return code from a broker refusal and show it in
`get mqttN.diag` ("refused: bad user/password (4)"). A refusal is not a
transport failure, so the TLS/socket fields are empty and a slot with wrong
credentials previously showed no useful detail at all.
`set wifi.powersave min` stored 0 and applied WIFI_PS_MIN_MODEM, but the
bridge's post-reconnect mapping read the same 0 as WIFI_PS_NONE. A node
explicitly configured for minimum modem sleep therefore ran with power save off
after its first reconnect, while `get wifi.powersave` still reported min. The
stored default is already 1 (`none`), so nothing here changes the product
default — it stops an operator's explicit choice from being reinterpreted.
Move the value/name/mode table into WifiPowerSavePolicy (pure, host-tested) and
use it from the CLI setter and getter, the web config snapshot and the bridge.
The bridge now also applies the mode when it finds the STA already associated at
start — that path has no connect transition to carry the setting, so a bridge
restart used to leave whatever mode was set before.
The watchdog took max(last_recv, last_irq, last_tx) of three raw millis()
timestamps. Around the 32-bit wrap a transmit stamped in the upper half of the
range is numerically larger than every fresh post-wrap receive, so it kept
winning for up to ~24 days: the watchdog measured silence from that stale
transmit, concluded the radio had gone deaf, and reset a radio that was
receiving normally — once per watchdog interval, until the old value stopped
winning.
Extract the decision into RadioWatchdog (pure, host-testable). It compares each
timestamp only against its own previous value, so any change is fresh activity,
and stamps it against a monotonic 64-bit clock extended from millis(). Evidence
older than one 32-bit cycle now stays old instead of aliasing back to "recent",
which the previous unsigned-subtraction age could not do either.
Covered in test/test_radio_watchdog: pre-wrap TX with continuous post-wrap RX,
genuine silence across the wrap, silence past a full millis() cycle, no activity
since boot, disabled watchdog, TX-only traffic, and a stalled mesh loop.
Use measured text rows for companion and repeater layouts, retain the V4 6px footer, and add overlap and navigation regressions. Correct the MQTT logging sleep documentation contract test.
Keep stealth separate from custom, saved-random and rotating MAC policies without migrating the development MAC mode. Persist authenticated peer state, guard advertising transitions and recovery, and expose the setting through the CLI and WebConfig.
Add regression and CI checks and record exact XIAO BLE pairing, reconnect, reboot and address-rotation hardware results.