perf(mqtt): allocate slot JWT token buffers on demand

MQTTSlot carried an inline char auth_token[768] -- 768 of its 1192 bytes --
for every runtime slot, whether the slot was JWT, username/password, disabled,
or above the active-slot cap. Now a char* allocated by ensureSlotAuthToken()
from createSlotAuthToken(), the sole writer, which runs only once a slot is
confirmed to have a JWT audience.

Because _slots[] is a fixed member array, this shrinks the bridge object
unconditionally at construction and re-adds only what is used:

  MQTTSlot     1192 ->  428 B  (-764)
  MQTTBridge  non-PSRAM 12032 -> 9740 B  (-2292)
                  PSRAM 10080 -> 5496 B  (-4584)

The object is allocated as one contiguous block at boot, so a smaller boot-time
chunk is easier to satisfy and leaves a larger contiguous remainder; JWT slots
then take 768 B each as separate blocks. Net steady-state saving is 768 B per
slot that never creates a token -- 768 B on a fully configured board, up to
3840 B on a PSRAM board with one JWT slot. 22 of the 29 presets are
MQTT_AUTH_JWT, so this is mostly reclaiming unconfigured slots rather than
non-JWT ones.

Lifetime rules, which are the whole risk here:
- setCredentials() stores this pointer in _mqtt_cfg rather than copying, and
  esp-mqtt re-reads it whenever a later connect() re-applies a dirtied config.
  So the buffer is freed only alongside the client, in destroySlotClients(),
  after the delete. MQTTSlot::broker_uri already carries an "avoids dangling
  pointer" comment from this same hazard with setServer().
- teardownSlot() still clears the token to an empty string but keeps the
  buffer: the client survives teardown and does not clear cfg->password (only
  setupSlot()'s reconfigure branch does). Freeing there would dangle.
- Never freed per reconnect, preserving the churn-avoidance the inline buffer
  was there for.

Allocation goes through MQTTRuntimeBufferLifecycle (already host-tested) using
plain malloc, so the buffer stays in internal DRAM exactly where it was when
inline. Failure propagates through createSlotAuthToken()'s existing bool.

The two call sites that create a token and then test it (preset JWT in
setupSlot, and the custom-slot audience path) now null-check first; the five
other readers are all inside if (createSlotAuthToken(...)) success branches and
need no change. destroySlotClients() releases the token unconditionally rather
than after its client null-check, so a token can never outlive its slot.

flash  non-PSRAM 1592697 -> 1592801 B (+104)
           PSRAM 1555109 -> 1555213 B (+104)
267/267 native tests pass; both observer envs build clean.
This commit is contained in:
agessaman committed 2026-08-04 09:45:30 -07:00
1 parent c833da10e9
commit 9141ad854f
2 files changed
+65 -20

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+54 -17
View File
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ MQTTBridge::MQTTBridge(NodePrefs *prefs, MQTTPrefs *obs, mesh::PacketManager *mg
_slots[i].enabled = false;
_slots[i].client = nullptr;
_slots[i].preset = nullptr;
// auth_token[0] == '\0' after memset above — no valid token
// auth_token == nullptr after memset above — allocated on first token creation
_slots[i].connected = false;
_slots[i].initial_connect_done = false;
_slots[i].token_expires_at = 0;
@@ -1670,21 +1670,52 @@ bool MQTTBridge::ensureSlotClient(int index) {
return true;
}
// Allocate this slot's JWT token buffer. Called only from createSlotAuthToken(), the
// sole writer, so a slot on a non-JWT preset (or no preset at all) never allocates.
// Internal DRAM, matching where the buffer lived when it was inline in MQTTSlot.
bool MQTTBridge::ensureSlotAuthToken(int index) {
if (index < 0 || index >= RUNTIME_MQTT_SLOTS) return false;
MQTTSlot& slot = _slots[index];
slot.auth_token = static_cast<char*>(MQTTRuntimeBufferLifecycle::allocateIfMissing(
slot.auth_token, AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE, malloc));
if (slot.auth_token == nullptr) {
MQTT_DEBUG_PRINTLN("MQTT%d: out of memory allocating auth token", index + 1);
return false;
}
slot.auth_token[0] = '\0';
return true;
}
// Safe only once this slot's client is gone: setCredentials() gave the client this
// pointer, and esp-mqtt re-reads it from _mqtt_cfg on any later connect() that
// re-applies a dirtied config. See the MQTTSlot::auth_token comment.
void MQTTBridge::releaseSlotAuthToken(int index) {
if (index < 0 || index >= RUNTIME_MQTT_SLOTS) return;
MQTTSlot& slot = _slots[index];
slot.auth_token = static_cast<char*>(
MQTTRuntimeBufferLifecycle::release(slot.auth_token, free));
slot.token_expires_at = 0;
slot.last_token_renewal = 0;
}
void MQTTBridge::destroySlotClients() {
for (int i = 0; i < RUNTIME_MQTT_SLOTS; i++) {
MQTTSlot& slot = _slots[i];
if (slot.client == nullptr) continue;
if (slot.client->connected()) {
slot.client->disconnect();
if (slot.client != nullptr) {
if (slot.client->connected()) {
slot.client->disconnect();
}
#ifdef ESP_PLATFORM
vTaskDelay(pdMS_TO_TICKS(50));
#else
delay(50);
#endif
delete slot.client;
slot.client = nullptr;
}
#ifdef ESP_PLATFORM
vTaskDelay(pdMS_TO_TICKS(50));
#else
delay(50);
#endif
delete slot.client;
slot.client = nullptr;
// Unconditional: only now is the token unreachable from the client's stored
// config, and a token without a client would otherwise leak.
releaseSlotAuthToken(i);
}
}
@@ -1727,7 +1758,7 @@ void MQTTBridge::setupSlot(int index) {
cfg->username = nullptr;
cfg->password = nullptr;
#endif
slot.auth_token[0] = '\0';
if (slot.auth_token) slot.auth_token[0] = '\0';
slot.connected = false;
slot.token_expires_at = 0;
slot.last_token_renewal = 0;
@@ -1760,7 +1791,7 @@ void MQTTBridge::setupSlot(int index) {
// Try to create token and connect (will succeed only if NTP synced)
if (slot.preset->auth_type == MQTT_AUTH_JWT) {
createSlotAuthToken(index);
if (slot.auth_token[0] != '\0') {
if (slot.auth_token && slot.auth_token[0] != '\0') {
slot.client->setCredentials(_jwt_username, slot.auth_token);
}
} else if (slot.preset->auth_type == MQTT_AUTH_USERPASS) {
@@ -1871,9 +1902,9 @@ void MQTTBridge::setupSlot(int index) {
// Custom slot authentication: JWT if audience is set, else username/password
if (slot.audience[0] != '\0') {
// JWT auth for custom slot — create initial token (buffer is always inline)
// JWT auth for custom slot — create initial token (allocates the buffer)
createSlotAuthToken(index);
if (slot.auth_token[0] != '\0') {
if (slot.auth_token && slot.auth_token[0] != '\0') {
slot.client->setCredentials(_jwt_username, slot.auth_token);
}
MQTT_DEBUG_PRINTLN("MQTT%d custom broker using JWT auth (audience: %s)", index + 1, slot.audience);
@@ -1903,7 +1934,9 @@ void MQTTBridge::teardownSlot(int index) {
#endif
}
slot.auth_token[0] = '\0';
// Invalidate the token but keep the buffer: the client survives teardown and still
// holds this pointer in its config (see MQTTSlot::auth_token).
if (slot.auth_token) slot.auth_token[0] = '\0';
slot.connected = false;
slot.initial_connect_done = false;
slot.broker_uri[0] = '\0';
@@ -2172,6 +2205,10 @@ bool MQTTBridge::createSlotAuthToken(int index) {
}
if (!audience || audience[0] == '\0') return false;
// This slot is confirmed JWT, so it needs the token buffer. Allocated on first use
// and kept thereafter; every caller already treats false as "no usable token".
if (!ensureSlotAuthToken(index)) return false;
// Ensure JWT username is set
if (_jwt_username[0] == '\0') {
char public_key_hex[65];
+11 -3
View File
@@ -86,9 +86,15 @@ private:
bool connected; // Updated in callbacks
bool initial_connect_done; // True after first connect() call
// JWT auth state (used by preset JWT slots and custom slots with audience set)
// Inline buffer avoids per-reconnect heap alloc/free churn (fragmentation source).
char auth_token[AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE]; // empty string = no valid token
// JWT auth state (used by preset JWT slots and custom slots with audience set).
// nullptr until this slot first creates a token, so a slot that is unconfigured,
// capped off, or on a non-JWT preset never pays for AUTH_TOKEN_SIZE. Allocated by
// ensureSlotAuthToken() and then held for the client's lifetime -- never freed per
// reconnect (alloc/free churn is a fragmentation source) and never freed on
// teardown, because setCredentials() hands this exact pointer to the client and
// esp-mqtt re-reads it whenever a later connect() re-applies a dirtied config.
// Freed only alongside the client in destroySlotClients().
char* auth_token; // nullptr or empty string = no valid token
unsigned long token_expires_at;
unsigned long last_token_renewal;
@@ -409,6 +415,8 @@ private:
// This avoids delete/new cycles that shed ~40 KB of mbedTLS buffers per
// reconfigure and fragment the internal heap on non-PSRAM boards.
bool ensureSlotClient(int index); // Allocate this slot's persistent client + callbacks on first use
bool ensureSlotAuthToken(int index); // Allocate this slot's JWT token buffer on first token creation
void releaseSlotAuthToken(int index);// Free the token buffer (only with the client — see MQTTSlot)
void destroySlotClients(); // Delete all persistent clients (shutdown only)
void setupSlot(int index); // Configure and connect the slot's existing client
void teardownSlot(int index); // Disconnect the slot's client (keeps the object alive)