Jean-Pierre MartineauandClaude Opus 5
01ca242c98
The NODE lane suited the two classes that name a node and left every other one reading a dash. On this mesh that is half the traffic: the direct messages, requests, responses, returned paths, acks and traces that relay past us naming no origin. So the lane asks each class its own question instead, and the header says SUBJECT — the word that stays true down the whole column. An advert or a telemetry frame is still about its node. A channel text is about its channel, named by the key whose MAC confirms the frame — never by the fingerprint alone, which 256 buckets make no proof at all; a channel we hold no key for reads as that fingerprint and says so. A direct message, request, response, returned path or anonymous request is about the two nodes it travels between, drawn sender → recipient on the hop-sequence widget, so endpoints read exactly as route hops do: resolved names, key-derived hues, our own node white the moment a frame is addressed to us. Too wide, and the sender drops to its hash — the frame is addressed, so the addressee is the half worth the cells. An ack is about the message it answers, a trace about its tag. And an unsigned channel post is filed under its channel rather than the bare word "channel", which named nothing. Half of that was unreadable before because nobody had opened the frame. The companion hands every overheard packet to the library, which decodes the body for exactly two classes — advert and channel text — and leaves the rest as bytes. Those bytes are not opaque: MeshCore addresses a frame in the first few of them, and core/frames.py now reads them, class by class, against the layouts the protocol's own docs/payloads.md publishes. The trace tag is the little-endian uint32 the firmware writes, so it reads as the same number a trace reply reports; an ack's checksum keeps wire order, the form the companion reports its own delivery acks in. Two checks guard every decode, because a wrong slice yields not an error but a plausible-looking hash: the frame's payload version must be v1 (the header reserves two bits for a v2 that widens both hash and MAC), and the body must be long enough for the layout its class promises. Either failing yields nothing at all. The feed opens seeded from history, so any of this that lived only in a live event's raw payload would leave the opening screen blank — the same problem the channel-text crypto trio had. Same answer: three columns (dest/src/tag), written on capture and restored to the very keys the event used, so a replayed frame and a fresh one read identically all the way up. Older rows carry NULL until re-heard. The viewer gained the matching rows: to, from, tag, acks, and a channel for a datagram — whose body is not text, but whose MAC still names it. Verified against the MeshCore protocol documentation and firmware source, then corroborated on the air: every frame captured off the radio has a body length that decomposes exactly into its documented layout, an anonymous request's 51 bytes (1 + 32 + 2 + one AES block) included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>