The stop timeout bounded only the cooperative attempt. Its fallback tears down
clients from the calling task, and both helpers skipped the stop entirely when
the client reported not-connected — then deleted it anyway. That is the exact
shape of the dangerous case: a client whose DISCONNECTED callback has already
cleared its connected flag while it sits inside esp_mqtt_client_stop() reports
not-connected, so the stop was skipped precisely when it mattered and the
object was freed from under a live ESP-MQTT task.
Both helpers take a force flag, and only the dirty branch passes it. force is
deliberately not gated on connected(), and routes through the existing
forceStop() rather than disconnect(), whose wait for the DISCONNECTED event is
unbounded. Every other caller — the non-ESP32 release path, the Core-0
cooperative teardown, reconfigure, and the slot-cap path — keeps its current
behaviour byte for byte.
This does not make the path bounded. esp_mqtt_client_stop() waits on the
client's STOPPED_BIT with portMAX_DELAY on the pinned framework, so a client
wedged inside mbedTLS can still block the caller. The change trades a
free-under-a-live-task for a wait, which is the safer of the two failure modes.
Bounding it properly, and the surrounding destroy-while-still-stopping hazard,
need the ownership handoff reworked; that is tracked separately.