agessaman
d6f8a87183
- Allow mqtt.neighbors and mqtt.neighbors.interval in the WebConfigKeys set-key allowlist (the CLI enforces the PSRAM guard; the stub reply handles non-PSRAM). - Emit neighbors + neighbors_interval (hours) in the WebConfigServer config JSON. - Add a "Publish neighbors" toggle and a "Neighbors interval (hours)" field (12-336) to the Publishing card, with getVal() cases in webui/index.html. - Cover both keys in test_webconfig_keys. WebConfigHtml.h is a gitignored build artifact regenerated by the pre-build hook from index.html, so it is not committed. Verified: test_webconfig_keys passes and the T_Beam_S3_Supreme observer_mqtt firmware builds [SUCCESS].
79 lines
3.5 KiB
C
79 lines
3.5 KiB
C
#pragma once
|
|
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include "MQTTPresets.h" // MAX_MQTT_SLOTS
|
|
|
|
// Classification of the config keys the web portal is allowed to drive through
|
|
// the CLI `set` handlers. Factored out of WebConfigServer.cpp so the allowlist
|
|
// and the (attacker-facing) key parsing can be unit-tested on the host without
|
|
// pulling in the whole ESP32 web server (see test/test_webconfig_keys).
|
|
//
|
|
// Everything here is pure string logic. The functions are `static inline` so
|
|
// each translation unit that includes this gets its own copy (there are only
|
|
// two: WebConfigServer.cpp and the test), avoiding any ODR concern.
|
|
|
|
// Keys mapping to CLI `set <key> <value>` handlers. Everything not listed here
|
|
// is rejected, so a crafted request can't reach arbitrary commands (`erase`,
|
|
// `password`, ...) through the batch.
|
|
static const char* const WC_ALLOWED_SET_KEYS[] = {
|
|
// NodePrefs (radio / node)
|
|
"name", "lat", "lon", "radio", "tx", "af", "rxdelay", "txdelay",
|
|
"cad", "radio.rxgain", "repeat", "advert.interval", "flood.advert.interval",
|
|
"flood.max", "flood.max.advert", "flood.max.unscoped", "loop.detect",
|
|
// MQTTPrefs (WiFi / MQTT / misc observer)
|
|
"wifi.ssid", "wifi.pwd", "wifi.powersave",
|
|
"mqtt.origin", "mqtt.iata", "mqtt.status", "mqtt.packets", "mqtt.raw",
|
|
"mqtt.tx", "mqtt.rx", "mqtt.interval", "mqtt.neighbors", "mqtt.neighbors.interval",
|
|
"mqtt.ntp", "mqtt.owner", "mqtt.email",
|
|
"timezone", "timezone.offset", "snmp", "snmp.community",
|
|
};
|
|
static const char* const WC_ALLOWED_SLOT_KEYS[] = {
|
|
"preset", "server", "port", "username", "password", "token", "topic", "audience",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// True when `key` is a well-formed per-slot key ("mqttN.<field>" with N in
|
|
// 1..MAX_MQTT_SLOTS). The shortest such key is "mqttN.x" (7 chars), and this
|
|
// probes key[4..6], so the length guard must come first — an attacker-supplied
|
|
// "mqtt" or "m" would otherwise read past the terminator.
|
|
static inline bool wcIsSlotKeyPrefix(const char* key) {
|
|
return strlen(key) >= 7 && memcmp(key, "mqtt", 4) == 0
|
|
&& key[4] >= '1' && key[4] <= ('0' + MAX_MQTT_SLOTS) && key[5] == '.';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline bool wcIsAllowedSetKey(const char* key) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(WC_ALLOWED_SET_KEYS) / sizeof(WC_ALLOWED_SET_KEYS[0]); i++) {
|
|
if (strcmp(key, WC_ALLOWED_SET_KEYS[i]) == 0) return true;
|
|
}
|
|
// mqtt<1-6>.<field>
|
|
if (wcIsSlotKeyPrefix(key)) {
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(WC_ALLOWED_SLOT_KEYS) / sizeof(WC_ALLOWED_SLOT_KEYS[0]); i++) {
|
|
if (strcmp(&key[6], WC_ALLOWED_SLOT_KEYS[i]) == 0) return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Keys carrying a secret whose stored value is masked with the placeholder in
|
|
// the UI; a POST echoing the placeholder for one of these is dropped (unchanged).
|
|
static inline bool wcIsSecretKey(const char* key) {
|
|
if (strcmp(key, "wifi.pwd") == 0) return true;
|
|
if (wcIsSlotKeyPrefix(key)
|
|
&& (strcmp(&key[6], "password") == 0 || strcmp(&key[6], "token") == 0)) return true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Browser-generated request IDs are exactly eight random bytes encoded as
|
|
// hexadecimal. Keeping the grammar deliberately small makes the ID safe to
|
|
// echo in JSON/logs and prevents an empty or truncated ID from weakening the
|
|
// save/result correlation contract.
|
|
static inline bool wcIsValidReqId(const char* reqid) {
|
|
if (reqid == NULL || strlen(reqid) != 16) return false;
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
|
|
char c = reqid[i];
|
|
if (!((c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
|
|
(c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') ||
|
|
(c >= 'A' && c <= 'F'))) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|