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# Management reports (MGR1/MGR2) Available on repeater (including observer), room-server and sensor firmware. Companions/terminal-chat nodes and KISS modems do not originate these reports. Off by default. A management password and explicit enable are both required. No radio settings, existing preferences layout, or OTA authorization policy is changed by enabling reporting. This protocol does **not** authorize updates. Current firmware emits `MGR2`, including a public USB logging/recovery snapshot and its latest watchdog event. Updated decoders still accept released `MGR1`; older decoder copies need an update to read MGR2. The earlier USB-only MGR2 development layout was never released and was replaced before release. Reporting USB status does not enable logging or change retry policy. ## CLI Run through the existing local CLI or an authenticated administrator session: ``` get data.tx set data.tx path 1:12ab77 set data.tx region auto set mgmt.password <12-to-96-byte password> set mgmt.direct 5 set mgmt.flood 21 set mgmt.enabled on get mgmt set mgmt.enabled off ``` Use a long randomly generated password. There is no password getter. Firmware stores the derived 32-byte key, not the plaintext password. That stored key is equivalent authority to decrypt reports and must also be protected. Passwords entered into terminal programs may still be recorded by those programs. The recognized firmware password command wipes its value from the input buffer on success and error, including unavailable management or allocation failure. `data.tx` is the single shared route for management reports, telemetry history, and future scheduled data producers. Its fresh-install defaults are `path=direct` (zero hops) and `region=auto`; configuring it never enables a producer. Paths use `1:`, `2:` or `3:` followed by complete hop hashes without separators, or the comma-separated form accepted by `set outpath`. Empty hops, including a trailing comma, are rejected. `none` removes the path. `get/set mgmt.path` remain compatibility aliases for `get/set data.tx path`. Alias expansion that exceeds the command buffer is rejected, not truncated. `region=auto` uses the radio's configured default region when it is usable; otherwise it resolves the unique deepest flood-enabled entry in the region hierarchy. If equally deep candidates make that choice ambiguous, it resolves to nothing and no fallback is transmitted. `default` requires and follows `region default`; a region name pins that named scope. `none` disables scoped fallback. The resolved transport key is looked up when a report starts, so edits to the region definition take effect without rewriting `/data_tx`. The direct path leads to the receiver/uplink's vicinity; this broadcast-radio datagram has no private destination identity. The radio ID in the payload identifies the reporter. Direct and flood schedules are independently configurable and may each be turned off. Fresh settings are `direct=5d` and `flood=21d`; global reporting is still off until `mgmt.enabled on`. Direct accepts 5-90 days and requires the shared path. Flood accepts 21-90 days and requires a resolvable shared region. At least one route must remain active while reporting is enabled. The legacy `set mgmt.interval N` shorthand enables both, setting direct to `N` and flood to `max(21,N)`. No transmission is sent merely by configuring a password. Initial reporting waits for the configured schedules. Invalid settings leave saved configuration, countdowns, and any report pages already in progress unchanged. Day counts must be unsigned decimal integers; signs and trailing text are rejected. Reports have deterministic per-radio/per-sequence jitter of up to an hour; pages are spaced at least a minute apart. Watchdog events appear in the next scheduled snapshot, not as immediate radio alerts. Multiple events between snapshots can replace the latest-event record; this is not a complete off-node event history. The radio cannot know that an observer uploaded a packet to MQTT, so the flood schedule is deliberately independent of direct transmission. A region-scoped `TRANSPORT_FLOOD` is sent at its independently configured interval. An unresolved or ambiguous data region blocks that transmission rather than sending an unscoped flood. If direct and flood become due together, the flood is sent and replaces the redundant direct copy. Ordinary reports are never retried in a tight loop; a partial report gives up after an hour. Existing relay filters, hop limits and duty constraints still apply. Schedule state is atomically reserved **before** transmission, and checkpointed hourly. Timers use elapsed powered-on time rather than the RTC: clock corrections cannot create floods, and reboot does not clear the budget. Downtime is not credited; each reboot can delay a report by up to an additional hour. This is a deliberately conservative tradeoff for nodes with unreliable clocks. Off/on and password changes do not reset the flood limit. Corrupt/unreadable state or failed writes stop reporting; `get mgmt` shows `FAULT(no TX)` until storage is repaired and the radio restarted. `/management` and the shared `/data_tx` are versioned, CRC-protected, and replaced transactionally. On upgrade, an existing saved `data.tx` route takes precedence over the legacy management-only path. Otherwise that path must be saved successfully to `/data_tx` before reporting resumes. A failed migration leaves the old `/management` file intact for retry after storage is repaired and the radio restarted. Weekly history is collected once a minute while enabled. Hour-bucket extrema cover 7 days to 7 days + 1 hour (conservative boundary bucket). The first report after enable/reboot is marked partial where appropriate. Since-report extrema reset after all pages have been queued, retaining readings taken since the snapshot for the next report. These statistics are not durable; reboot loses the history, not the flood countdown. Temperature is MCU temperature, not ambient. Reporting does not wake GPS, start Wi-Fi, or initialize external OTA media. Unknown capabilities/readiness are explicitly distinguishable from false. History/snapshot working memory is allocated only when reporting is enabled and is bounded to 1.5 KiB, plus a small configuration object and temporary stack use. ## Routing and MQTT Both direct/path and flood reports use **`PAYLOAD_TYPE_GRP_DATA` (`0x06`)**. The route bits independently select direct or flood. `MGR1`/`MGR2` are application extensions with **literally plaintext public fields**, not a call to the ordinary encrypted `createGroupDatagram()` builder. A fixed public marker is not an owner or password-derived channel ID. There is no outer channel encryption. The body is padded with zeroes to a group-compatible length `3 + 16*n` (maximum 179 bytes). Existing repeaters in the checked upstream implementation route group data without requiring a successful channel decryption. This fork recognizes the management envelope before ordinary channel processing. Reception of a management packet never exempts it from forwarding policy. Some third-party firmware may apply additional channel/layout policies; interoperability with every fork is not guaranteed. Packet logging/uplinks can capture it without the password. `RAW_CUSTOM` (`0x0F`) is **not used for reports** because stock upstream does not flood-route it. The observer's existing MQTT `PACKET` JSON supplies the complete frame in `raw`. No broker configuration or password changes are necessary to capture a report. The decoder understands all four route forms, 1-3-byte hashes, scope transport codes, and duplicate copies heard by several uplinks: ``` python -m pip install -r tools/management/requirements.txt python tools/management/report.py --mqtt capture.jsonl ``` The password is prompted, not supplied as a process argument. Input may be JSONL or a JSON array of MQTT messages. Alternatively omit `--mqtt` for a JSON array of canonical payload hex strings. `--match-admin FULL_PUBLIC_KEY` matches a known administrator against the encrypted fingerprints in either input mode. MQTT captures match each radio's fingerprints separately. Invalid files or keys are rejected before the password prompt; an unavailable password input gives a command-line error instead of a traceback. This is an offline capture decoder, not a broker subscriber or downlink service. For a browser-local decoder that also decrypts and authenticates ACL entries, use the [Management report decoder](management_decoder.md). It does not upload the captured packet or password. ## Canonical MGR2 payload (little endian) | Offset | Bytes | Field | |---:|---:|---| | 0 | 4 | `MGR2` | | 4 | 16 | First 16 bytes of reporter public key | | 20 | 4 | Persisted report sequence (never wraps; exhaustion stops TX) | | 24 | 4 | RTC Unix timestamp; advisory, may be wrong | | 28 | 4 | Firmware major/minor/patch/pre packed as mOTA version | | 32 | 4 | Bootloader packed version, or unknown | | 36 | 4 | EndF target ID | | 40 | 8 | Complete mOTA delta-base body hash | | 48 | 4 | EndF image length | | 52 | 4 | Staging capacity; planning still checks actual package geometry | | 56 | 4 | OTA capability bits | | 60 | 2 | Uptime hours, saturated at 65535 | | 62 | 4 | Weekly minimum mV, minimum C, maximum C | | 66 | 4 | Since-report extrema in the same format | | 70 | 1 | History coverage hours, capped at 168 | | 71 | 1 | Interval days for this report's direct or flood schedule | | 72 | 1 | Role: 1 repeater, 2 room server, 3 sensor | | 73 | 1 | Compiled/detected capability bits | | 74 | 1 | Active status bits | | 75 | 1 | Mask of status bits whose state is known | | 76 | 2 | Validity/partial-history flags | | 78 | 1 | Zero-based page index | | 79 | 1 | Total pages (1-9) | | 80 | 1 | Unique ACL count (0-36) | | 81 | 1 | First ACL index in this page | | 82 | 1 | ACL entries on this page (0-4) | | 83 | 2 | USB status flags | | 85 | 1 | Packed USB recovery stage and retry backoff step | | 86 | 4 | USB full-reboot retry interval seconds | | 90 | 4 | USB inactive seconds | | 94 | 4 | USB continuous Auto qualification seconds | | 98 | 1 | Latest watchdog reason/action/durability code | | 99 | 4 | Latest watchdog event RTC Unix epoch; advisory, zero if unavailable | | 103 | 4 | Uptime seconds at that event's boot | | 107 | 4 | Latest watchdog event sequence, saturated at 4294967295 | | 111 | 13 * count | AES-SIV encrypted ACL entries | | after ACL | 16 | Full AES-SIV authentication tag | | after tag | 0-15 | Zero padding to group-compatible length; not part of canonical payload | MGR2 retains all 36 ACL entries, using four per page and up to nine pages. The largest canonical page is 179 bytes and already group-compatible; the radio payload budget is unchanged. The USB snapshot is frozen with the other public fields at report start and repeated on each page. It is not a live host-health monitor. USB flag bits 0-10 are, in order: supported, logging enabled, watchdog enabled, host connected, reader connected, stalled, recovering, recovery deferred, persistence ready, watchdog Auto, and logger active. Bits 11-15 must be zero. Byte 85 bits 0-1 hold stage: 0 idle, 1 soft-recovery wait, 2 re-enumeration wait, and 3 reboot pending. Bits 2-5 hold the saved backoff step; bits 6-7 must be zero. Backoff is not a count of successful recoveries. The three timers are unsigned seconds; local recovery/reboot counters are not sent. The retry field is the saved backoff interval, not a countdown to an action; inactive age is reported separately. USB-only cleanup can precede that interval. Unsupported USB observation/recovery is explicitly represented by a false supported bit, not omitted or mistaken for a connected healthy reader. USB status describes the radio's observed transport and policy, not proof that the host process, MQTT uplink, SSH service, or Pi is healthy. Host/reader connection alone does not mean a logging client is running. The logger-active bit means recent USB stats polling within a 15-minute lease while logging is enabled and the observed USB host/reader link is not stalled, separate from USB attachment or an open reader. The existing five-minute stats polls renew this lease; no new client-registration or heartbeat command is required. This does not identify the client, prove logs reached MQTT or disk, or show that the Pi remains otherwise healthy. Missing watchdog state on new or upgraded installations defaults to Auto. Auto promotes to saved On after 14 continuous healthy logging-USB days with renewed stats polling; its qualification age resets on reboot, detach, stall, stats-lease expiry, or USB logging off. Explicit On and Off remain available. Nonlogging/no-reader nodes remain Auto without watchdog board reboots. The Auto flag and age report this qualification separately from an enabled On policy. Use the node's `get usb.watchdog` and `set usb.watchdog off|on|auto` CLI to inspect or change policy; receiving a management snapshot changes nothing. The 13-byte latest-event block is all zero when no event is available. Otherwise byte 98 bits 0-3 are the reason mask: host absent, reader absent, TX stalled, and confirmed stats client inactive. Bits 4-6 hold the action: 1 software recovery attempted, 2 re-enumeration attempted, 3 reboot requested, or 4 reboot cancelled after a final health/ownership check. Bit 7 means the event was saved and verified on durable storage. Sequence is nonzero for a present event. Physical faults may combine reason bits; stats-only expiry cannot authorize a board reboot. Epoch zero is allowed when the clock source is unavailable. Event time is the node's advisory clock, not verified UTC. Default clocks can start at a plausible fixed date. Clock corrections do not rewrite old events; recorded uptime and sequence help review them independently. A saved reboot request is intent, not proof of a completed reset. The latest event survives normal reboot and mode changes, but is not a log of hardware hangs or sudden power failures. See [USB logging watchdog](usb_logging_watchdog.md) for storage failure, cancellation, and review limitations. Legacy MGR1 retains the same offsets through byte 82, followed immediately by encrypted ACL entries at byte 83 and the authentication tag. It carries six entries per page and up to six pages, with no USB block. Its absent USB status is decoded as unavailable, not as all switches off. Each private entry is a per-radio 12-byte keyed fingerprint followed by flags: bit 0 administrator, bit 1 trusted OTA signer. The firmware combines permissions for the same fingerprint before paging, so every transmitted entry is unique. Decoders reject authenticated duplicate fingerprints within or across pages; repeated identical packet copies from multiple uplinks are still deduplicated. An oversized ACL fails closed rather than silently truncating. The reported allowlist includes all current full administrators and all four possible trusted OTA signing keys; region/filter managers and ordinary clients are excluded. Feature bits: 0 Wi-Fi, 1 GPS, 2 NTP, 3 USB data, 4 LoRa OTA. Wi-Fi active means connected, GPS means receiver enabled (not necessarily a fix), NTP means an actual accepted NTP response this boot, USB means observable native USB data connection (not power or an unobservable external UART bridge). OTA capability means compiled support; active means an established usable apply/store path. Validity bits: 0 firmware version, 1 bootloader version, 2 EndF/base identity, 3 staging capacity, 4 partial week, 5 partial since-report period, 6 MCU temperature. Voltage is unsigned millivolts, zero missing. Temperatures: zero missing, 1-251 represent -50..200 C, 252 below range, 253 above range, 254-255 reserved. OTA bits: 0 protocol compiled, 1 transfer DEFLATE, 2 2-KiB app transfer blocks; bits 8-23 are apply codec bits (full/sequential/in-place). Transfer DEFLATE is not compressed bootloader apply. There is **no manifest ID**. Exact old binaries are still needed on the computer to generate a differential update; a hash alone cannot reconstruct them. Unknown metadata must not be treated as OTA readiness. ## Cryptography Password root: `SHA256("#" || literal UTF-8 password)` (hashtag-style derivation). Subkeys: `HMAC-SHA256(root, ASCII_domain || radio_id16)`. Domains: `MeshCore-MGR1-SIV`, `MeshCore-MGR1-ACL`. Fingerprint: `HMAC-SHA256(ACL_subkey, radio_id16 || full_admin_key32)[0:12]`. The same owner has different fingerprints on different radios. A collector needs a candidate administrator's full key to identify a fingerprint. Encryption is [RFC 5297 AES-SIV-CMAC-256](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297), using the existing rweather AES primitive. The single associated-data string is the complete clear header: 111 bytes for MGR2, including USB status and its event, or 83 bytes for MGR1. Both retain the existing derivation domains; the authenticated magic and layout distinguish their wire versions. Ciphertext is exactly the ACL byte length. Full 16-byte tag, no truncation. This deterministic misuse-resistant mode avoids reliance on the firmware's noncryptographic general-purpose RNG or RTC nonces. An identical restored snapshot may repeat ciphertext, but does not expose XORs of different ACL plaintexts as nonce-reused stream encryption would. All public fields are readable without a password but are authenticated only to password holders. A shared password authenticates knowledge of that password, **not** a unique individual radio identity; another holder can forge reports. There is no per-device signature. Collectors must enforce their own persisted sequence/replay policy and explicitly handle factory resets/restored backups. The decoder verifies snapshot consistency but does not maintain a database. This fast password derivation permits offline guessing, so twelve characters is only a minimum length, not a guarantee of password strength. Packet timing, public metadata and entry/page counts remain visible.