The Wi-Fi, LoRa first-stage and Partition Expander bridges serve an
unauthenticated /update behind an AP whose password was fixed and published,
so anyone in range during a migration could upload firmware while the private
key is staged. Use the old node's saved admin password as the WPA2
passphrase, read from /com_prefs or /node_prefs at offset 56 as the firmware
loads it. The operator already used that password to start the old updater.
Fall back to the published password, with a serial warning, when the saved
admin password is missing, unreadable, shorter than 8 characters or not
printable ASCII, so no node becomes unreachable. The legacy filesystem is
mounted without formatting and the password is never printed. Migration
admission, flash sequencing, /update gating and the USB bridge are unchanged.
Update both guides and the package README.
Add a sanitizer-backed host test that compiles the bridge's actual Wi-Fi
block against fake SPIFFS and WiFi: both boots, file precedence, WPA2 length
and terminator bounds, printable characters, stock 1.10/1.11 file sizes,
truncated fields, and mount, seek and partial-read failures. It fails 8 of 8
on the previous code and catches 27 of 27 code mutations. Verified 13 related
host test files and the esp32_s3_4mb_partition_migrator build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nullrouten0andClaude Opus 5.5
mikecarper