Integrate fractional Companion timezones and conditional Bluetooth pages while preserving the existing preference byte layout, transactional saves, and Full transport selector. Add migration, rollback, invalid-value, and UI profile regressions.
Upstream MeshCore, and this fork up to v1.17.1.6 except ESP32 Full
builds, rewrote /contacts3 in place, one record after another. A reset
or a full volume during that save leaves whole records followed by part
of the next one. Upstream reads such a file up to the short read. Here
readableContactFile() treats any size that is not a multiple of 152
bytes as unreadable, and since 2311160a9 the bounded recovery then
deletes /contacts3. On the first boot after an upgrade, three whole
records plus one stray byte became zero contacts.
Invariant: on ESP32, RP2040 and STM32, when /contacts3 holds at least
one whole record followed by part of one, and /contacts3.bak does not
exist, the whole records load and nothing is written or deleted at
boot. The next ordinary save publishes only whole records through the
existing transaction. Unchanged: whole-record images; a backup still
wins over an incomplete primary, including a backup that is unreadable
or of unknown presence at boot, which keeps its retry at the recovery
boundary; read errors keep the bounded recovery; a file with no whole
record is still discarded; nRF52 is not touched.
selectContactFile() makes this check only after the strict checks of
both names fail, through a new partial_tail mode of
readableContactFile(). loadContacts() drops its own size check; its
whole-record loop bound already stops before the tail.
Add test_companion_contact_partial_tail.py, which runs the real load,
recovery and save paths on the uncached ESP32, RP2040 and STM32
harness and on the ESP32 Full cache harness under ASan/UBSan. On the
old code all four fail with zero contacts and /contacts3 deleted. It
catches 14 of 15 mutations of this change, including a full revert;
the other drops a guard whose value is read only when the file handle
is valid. Two cases in the uncached storage fixture used a one-byte
truncation as their unreadable image; they now use a file shorter than
one record, so they still exercise the discard path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /api/room checked the room password on every request with no failure
limit, and a browser may send a new identity token each time. Any host that
reached WebConfig could guess the room admin password, which is also the
radio and /api/login admin password, at main-loop speed.
One budget now covers all browser tokens, with /api/login's numbers: at most
five distinct wrong passwords in each thirty-second window. After that, a
request carrying a password is refused without checking it until the window
ends. Wrong passwords count in read-only rooms too. Empty passwords are never
counted or refused, so public read-only access keeps working. The last four
wrong passwords are remembered by 8-byte SHA-256 digest and not counted
again, so a tab still polling with an old or mistyped password cannot use up
the budget. Successful sign-ins do not refund failures. Radio login is
unchanged.
test_room_web_service.py gains PASSWORD_LIMIT, which runs the real
processRoomRequest: refusal after five failures from five tokens; identical
replies for wrong, guest and admin passwords while refused, with no password
check (calls to authorizeRoomLogin are counted); no lock extension from 300
refused requests; the 29999/30000 ms boundary and the first window after
boot; read-only and empty-password cases; no refund on success; repeated,
rotating and read-only stale passwords; slow distinct failures ageing out;
and a guard that the digest ring stays in bounds. It fails on the previous
processRoomRequest at the sixth guess.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/api/login locked every client for 30 s after five failures from anyone.
Anyone who could reach the login page could keep the owner locked out by
failing on purpose. If no login succeeded after a lockout, the lock also
returned from 2^31 to 2^32 ms (about 24.9 to 49.7 days) later, because the
deadline was never cleared and was compared as a signed difference.
Count failures per remote address instead. Five failures lock that address
for 30 s, as before. A shared budget caps failures from all addresses
together, so changing address does not add guesses: it holds six failures
and refills one every 6 s, the old global rate, so one failing address can
never empty it on its own. While it is empty every client waits, as before.
Lock times are measured as elapsed time.
The policy is a pure header, WebConfigLoginThrottle.h.
test_webconfig_login_throttle.py runs it directly (isolation, boundaries,
one-hour rate bounds, millis() half-wrap, saturation, eviction) and runs the
real handleLogin with ArduinoJson under ASan/UBSan. Putting every client on
one key, as the old code did, fails the handler test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restart the retry interval without treating queue cleanup as completed USB transmission. Cover cancellation journals, fresh recovery deadlines, real progress and rollover, with historical policy and runtime negative controls.
Require a real raw-table save for same-value channel SETs. This repairs the false acknowledgement after successful constructor recovery of an older backup followed by a failed candidate write.
Keep resolved alias keys, raw AUTO policy and runtime generation untouched. Preserve GET and unchanged contact behavior, changed-policy validation and indeterminate-publication quarantine.
Cover real stale-backup creation, failure/retry, reboot and exact old-skip controls. Add actual alias/BaseChatMesh and raw app-key regression tests on all four backends. Verified 117 related host tests, 16 final caller rechecks, four firmware qualifications and linked nRF52 crypto checks.
Latch only channel storage on Indeterminate writer outcomes, including failed transaction setup. Preserve ordinary failure retries, confirmed rollback, contacts and the live accepted channel keys.
Exercise actual CLI and binary callers with all four storage backends, reboot behavior and exact missing-latch negative controls. Share TX storage failure diagnostics to retain the strict Wio-E5 Mini flash gate.
Verified 103 related host tests, four platform firmware qualifications and linked nRF52 crypto/stack checks. A separate stale-backup constructor/no-op acknowledgement case remains under audit.
Extract the production contact flush, retry and UI shutdown helpers instead of leaving stale fixture-only methods. Keep rollover negative controls and cover volatile contacts, accepted dirty work, authoritative repair and rebuild failures.
Recheck cached immutable paths before resetting the live table after raw I/O failure. Keep accepted RAM mutations, current jobs and save deadlines when reads recover; stronger source or publication uncertainty still forces full recovery. Use the existing recovery byte and a fixed scratch buffer, with no cache allocation or eviction.
Cover full-cache transient recovery, persistent I/O and checksum failures, nRF unread-scope restoration, active ESP jobs, real uncertain publication and unchanged lazy deadlines with sanitizer tests and restored-reset negative controls.
mikecarper
nullrouten0andClaude Opus 5.5