Protect remote admin identity backup replies
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@@ -1744,12 +1744,26 @@ for the tested XIAO handoff and host-cache caveats.
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- `set prv.key <private_key>`
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**Parameters:**
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- `private_key`: Private key in hex format (64 hex characters)
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- `private_key`: MeshCore expanded private key in hex format (128 hex characters)
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**Local connection only:** `get prv.key`. Companion also requires
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`ENABLE_PRIVATE_KEY_EXPORT=1`; use binary command `0x42` or the text terminal.
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Infrastructure `set prv.key` retains its administrator access rules.
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Infrastructure repeaters with `ENABLE_PRIVATE_KEY_EXPORT=1` also support
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`backup prv.key <16-hex-nonce>` for authenticated remote administrators. It
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returns `KEYBACKUP <nonce> <128-hex-private-key>` only as an end-to-end encrypted
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direct CLI reply. This separate command does not make `get prv.key` remotely
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available. Treat the reply as a secret: clients must not put it in chat history
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or debug logs and should encrypt any saved backup. An administrator password
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alone is not a safe backup-file encryption key. Firmware does not retain this
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reply in its remote CLI retry cache.
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Companion firmware must advertise `get key.backup.transport` as
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`ephemeral-routed-v1` before the phone requests it; that build delivers the
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reply only to the live attached client that requested it, without offline
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queuing or terminal echo.
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Older Companion firmware is not a safe transport for this backup flow.
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**Note:** Requires reboot to take effect after setting
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---
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