Protect remote admin identity backup replies

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mikecarper committed 2026-09-26 18:01:43 -07:00
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@@ -1744,12 +1744,26 @@ for the tested XIAO handoff and host-cache caveats.
- `set prv.key <private_key>`
**Parameters:**
- `private_key`: Private key in hex format (64 hex characters)
- `private_key`: MeshCore expanded private key in hex format (128 hex characters)
**Local connection only:** `get prv.key`. Companion also requires
`ENABLE_PRIVATE_KEY_EXPORT=1`; use binary command `0x42` or the text terminal.
Infrastructure `set prv.key` retains its administrator access rules.
Infrastructure repeaters with `ENABLE_PRIVATE_KEY_EXPORT=1` also support
`backup prv.key <16-hex-nonce>` for authenticated remote administrators. It
returns `KEYBACKUP <nonce> <128-hex-private-key>` only as an end-to-end encrypted
direct CLI reply. This separate command does not make `get prv.key` remotely
available. Treat the reply as a secret: clients must not put it in chat history
or debug logs and should encrypt any saved backup. An administrator password
alone is not a safe backup-file encryption key. Firmware does not retain this
reply in its remote CLI retry cache.
Companion firmware must advertise `get key.backup.transport` as
`ephemeral-routed-v1` before the phone requests it; that build delivers the
reply only to the live attached client that requested it, without offline
queuing or terminal echo.
Older Companion firmware is not a safe transport for this backup flow.
**Note:** Requires reboot to take effect after setting
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